This is a rant about the Electoral College

It seems to me that the Electoral College system of the United States is both misunderstood and abused. The problems that "everybody sees" will the Electoral College is not that people from different States will have different voting strength, but that the way it has been used lately gives the strength to exact the States against which it was meant to protect. Confused? Fear not, all will be explained.

Harking back to Federalist Papers, No. 10. James Madison writes in his introductory paragraph that ":[c]omplaints are everywhere heard ... that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority." This is listed amongst other concerns, however, Madison quickly focuses in on the nature of faction, by which he means "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majoirty or a minority of tha whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." He furthers his stance by noting that there are two means by which factions can be cured: (1) removing its causes or (2) controlling its effects, the latter of which Madison admoinshed as impractical while maintaining any semblance of liberty.

As to the removal of causes, when in the case of the minority holding the faction, Madison admits that the republican model should keep it in check. The consequence of this ability, however, is noted that the majority could be the faction, whereby the rights and concerns of the minority can be easily ignored, and therefore abused. In fact, Madison poignantly cuts through to the central point: "Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situaiton, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequated control." That is, without alternate means available, only the majority can keep the majority in check; With human nature being what it is, with history to provide evidence to this point, this will eventually be grossly insufficient as a means to protect a minority of their natural rights. Madison has thus provided the motivation for a solution.

A "pure democracy ... can admit no cure for the mischiefs of faction.". However, a "republic ... opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking." Madison continues to list the ways in which a representative republic proves more effacacious than a pure democracy with regards to the motivation given above. Included in his arguments is that the number of representatives should be neither too few (to prevent cabalism) nor too many (to prevent multitudinous confusions). Madison is now providing the framework for a solution.

Through the various debates in the drafting of the Electoral College, Madison sought certain ideals moreso than even his own inclinations towards a solution. At first, he was wholly opposed to such institutions as the Electoral College. However, as shown above, in his own public words, he is in favor of it. This is not his being disingenuous; it is his eventual recognition of the importance of that ideal.

Some proponents argue that the Electoral College does not represent a democracy, despite Madison's argument, and thereby call for its abolition. However, it is substantially less often heard that the Senate ought to be abolished as well, despite its callous stipulation of two Senators per State regardless of the size of its population. Why is it that the concept of a bicameral legislature, with one body of the people and one body of the States is excepted, despite its non-democratic roots, and yet the Electoral College, which falls mathematically in-between their voting strengths is derided as atrocious on the basis of its being non-democratic? This, to me, is highly hypocritical. To argue against the Electoral College and not also against the Senate reveals an unjust bias.

Now, let us consider what damage the mathematics of the situation might bring. In order to do this, there must be a clear definition of what is meant by voting strength. Voting strength will be defined with reference to the democratic ideal. Let us set as exactly 1 the voting strength of a population for the election of a Representative. This voting strength is essentially identical for each person. (Although even that is not true as rounding errors are intrinsic to the system - ex: a State that just qualified for its fourth Representative technically has more voting strength per person than does a State that just missed qualifying for its fifth Representative. Both State receive only four Representatives despte the difference in their population numbers. To keep the mathematics simple, this minor discrepancy will be ignored and the effect will still be similarly impressive.

Consider now the issue of voting for an Elector. A state is granted a number of Electors equal to its number of Representative plus its number of Senators. (This proves the nature of its mathematical betweenness stated above.) A state of minimal population therefore was voting strength equal to exactly 3. This is determined by the formula Voting Strength = (Representatives + Senators)/(Representatives). Because the number of Senators is always 2, the limit of Voting Strength as Representatives tends upwards is 1. A State will 50 Representatives, for example, would receive a Voting Strength of (50+2)/(50) = 1.04, which is substantially less than the 3 of the smaller States' populations. This ratio should not, however, be looked at as an atrocity. It is in fact intended to specifically counterbalance the ability of those 50 Representatives of the large State to vastly outvote the 1 of any small State. That the populus of the smallest States have a voting strength nearly three times that of the large State might mean that their votes are not so easily discarded by the candidate seeking election.

The atrocity, as I see it, is that States are permitted to assign the full total of their Electors towards the majority candidate of their State. For example, in the case of a small State, a 50.01% majority, a State would ideally award Electors in the ratio 2:1, but as 48 States do today, would really award Electors in the ratio 3:0. The marginalization of the minority results in a single Elector shift. However, consider the case of a large State (let's say 51 Representatives to keep it odd): a 50.01% majority would ideally award Electors in the ratio 26:25, but would really award Electors in the ratio 51:0. This marginalization of the minority results in an Elector shift of 25 votes! That shift is about 8% of the 270 Electoral votes it takes to become elected President (which would only happen if the first 26 Electors were won). Why would a candidate seriously concern themselves with a small state when 16% of the victory is in a single location? By visiting only the 11 most populus States (according to the 2000 census data), a candidate can be elected President. Granted, this is not simply 22% of the population - it is in fact a majority of the population - however, the existence of battleground States has also vastly removed the motivation to visit the other smaller States. I hold in concept of Congress the 48 States which grant votes to the Electoral College that are not proportional to the will of their populus.

How would I see an Electoral College run? I strongly believe that the definition of Electoral Districts within a State risks gerrymandering politics. (Keep in mind that the ideal abuse of a gerrymander in this situation is to divide an unpopular view amongst different Districts.) Instead, I'd like to see a somewhat arbitrary delineation, such as the date of the year (out of 365 or 366) of one's birth plus the year of birth itself being divided by the number of Electors of the State to create categories, or virtual Districts. For example, if one were born on February 15th, 1960, then that person would have 31 (January) + 15 + 1960 = 2006 as their numerator. Then, let's say further that this person lived in a State of 10 Representatives. Divided the 2006 by the 10 and the remainder would determine the District. This person would be in virtual District 6 in that State. If the State grew more popular and gained an 11th Elector, then that person would divide 2006 by 11 to get a remainder of 4, hence that person would be in virtual District 4. I realize that this could be a notekeeper hassle; however, if this is what it takes both to prevent gerrymandering and also to insure what Madison wished to insure, then we as a Country should make it so.

The reasoning for such an arbitrary categorization is both to insure that candidate wish to visit each and every State, to vie for each and every vote, to understand that the small States be more enticing for a candidate to visit (with their 3:1.04 voting strength ratios), to understand that the large States are still enticing for a candidate to visit (with their total number of Electors), to understand that within a State there is no favored locale by virtue of a gerrymader, and so on. The functioning of the Electoral College would not be exactly as originally envisioned, but its intentions, and therefore protections, would be.

The intention is for the President to be representative of the issues and concerns of the population as a whole. Any system which discourages this very fact is inherently flawed. I acknowledge that my proposal does not adhere to the ideals of a pure democracy, but I would not want it to be such if that meant the unjust and abusive oppression of a minority. The ideal of democracy is for all voices to be able to be heard; it is just that the pragmatics of democracy are not well-suited for achieving this goal. As such, I also acknowledge that the Electoral College, without the "winner-take-all" provision, and without geographic gerrymandering, would be the best compromise that I have encountered.

Brandt, K. (2004). Madisonian Majority Tyranny, Minority Rights, & American Democracy: A New Defense of the Electoral College. Retrieved September 2, 2008 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/8/3/2/3/p83236_index.html and related pages.

Madison, J. (1787). Federalist No. 10 – The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection). Retrieved September 2, 2008 from http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fed10.htm

Samples, J. (2000). Hillary Clinton vs. James Madison. Retrieved September 2, 2008 from http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4448.

Samples, J. (2000). Keep the Electoral College. Retrieved September 2, 2008 from http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4419.